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Time for a public policy update in police liability? 
 
With the introduction of a single police force in Scotland on 1 April 2013, under 
the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, some critics have voiced concerns 
about local police accountability. The recent decision of the High Court in England 
in DSD, NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 
(QB) (hereinafter referred to as the “Worboys case”) has increased police 
accountability in the detection and investigation of crime, an area that historically 
has been subject to a high degree of immunity under the common law, being as 
it is, an area where the police have discretion in the allocation of resources. 
However success in this case was through the application of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (“HRA”), not the common law. The decision calls into question the common 
law development of police immunity in the investigation and detection of crime, 
which began with the policy reasons identified in the case Hill v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. The domestic courts have clung on to and even 
extended the reach of these policy reasons, most notably in the cases Brooks v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24 and Smith v Chief 
Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225. The Worboys case 
highlights the difference in approach between the common law and human rights 
law.  
 
The Worboys case was decided under the HRA, article 3. This is an unqualified 
article. The right against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment cannot be qualified unlike some of the other rights protected in 
articles 8 to 11, where amongst other grounds, the right can be qualified in order 
to protect health or morals; public safety; and/or the rights and freedoms of 
others. This provides some scope for public policy to be taken into account when 
determining whether a right has been violated in a particular set of circumstances. 
The unqualified nature of Article 3 however effectively prevents public policy from 
being considered. The Barrister Jon Holbrook was recently very critical in an article 
in the New Law Journal (164 NLJ 9) of the fact that policy was not taken into 
account when deciding the Worboys case. Public policy is however still very much 
a factor to be taken into account when considering the existence of a duty of care 
on public authorities and the police in particular under the common law of delict/ 
tort.  
 
 
The Worboys case was brought by two victims of the “black cab rapist” John 
Worboys. The claimants brought an action against the Metropolitan Police Service, 
for declarations and damages, for its failure to carry out an effective investigation 
into their allegations of serious sexual assault. The claims were brought under 
section 7 and 8 of the HRA. As is well known, section 6 of the HRA provides that 
it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. The defendant is a public authority. The question was whether 
the defendant, in the way it had treated the victims and subsequently investigated 
the alleged crimes, had acted incompatibly with articles 3 and 8. (Mr Justice Green 
focused his attentions on Article 3 being the broader of the two articles.) 
 
The High Court, relying on Hill; Brooks and Smith recognised that under the 
common law, the police do not owe a duty of care in relation to their investigation 
of a crime. However the issue before the Court was whether the HRA imposed a 
positive obligation and duty on the police vis a vis victims of crime in relation to 
the investigation of that crime, by virtue of the right the HRA gave to victims under 
Article 3 not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The defendant accepted only that the HRA gave rise to a limited right 
to victims, where the police were either directly or indirectly responsible for the 
harm perpetrated by a third party, for example where a prisoner attacked another 
prisoner, when both were in custody. But was there also liability to victims for a 
failure to investigate alleged crimes of a particularly severe nature, such that the 
failure amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment? 
 
Mr Justice Green helpfully collated a large number of the relevant cases decided 
in Strasbourg; identified the main facts and main points of principle in each case; 
and reported the decision of the court. He found that there was a consistent and 
settled body of case law from Strasbourg that established liability on the police for 
failure to investigate, by virtue of breach of Article 3. This duty was not dependent 
on article 1 but arose from the freestanding duty in Article 3. The duty did not 
simply arise where the state was directly or indirectly complicit in the violence; it 
was a free standing duty. Moreover Mr Justice Green felt bound to attach 
significant weight to this body of Strasbourg case law, primarily because in his 
opinion it was coherent, well evolved and its core tenets were settled.  
 
 
In addition therefore to the obligation on the police laid down in Osman v UK 
(23452/94) [1999] FLR 193 and domestically in Van Colle v Chief Constable of 
Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225, to take reasonable measures 
within the scope of their powers to avoid the risk to life, where they knew or ought 
to have known of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual 
from the criminal acts of a third party, the High Court held that Article 3 requires 
that where there is a credible or arguable claim by the victim or a third party that 
a person has been subjected to treatment at the hands of a private party that can 
be categorised as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, the police are under 
a duty to ensure that there is an effective, prompt and reasonable official 
investigation which is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible. Allegations of grave or serious crime such as rape and serious 
sexual assault will come within the ambit of Article 3.  
   
Mr Justice Green emphasised however that allegations of failure had to meet a 
threshold of culpability and he quoted a part of the judgment from MC v Bulgaria 
(2005) 40 EHRR 20 which referred to “significant flaws” in the investigation. 
(Under the common law, even if a duty of care is found to exist in any particular 
case, there still requires to be established a breach in that duty of care.) Mr Justice 
Green repeated more than once the opinion of the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) that the duty created by Article 3 was not to impose impossible 
burdens on the police force (See Milanovic v Serbia (2014) 58 EHRR 33). He refers 
to a statement by the ECtHR in Szula v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR SE19 
where it says that in that case the facts did not disclose any “culpable disregard, 
discernible bad faith or lack of will on the part of the police or prosecuting 
authorities as regards properly holding perpetrators of serious criminal offences 
accountable pursuant to domestic law.” Perhaps this is the standard of care that 
is to be applied to the police in relation to this duty? 
 
What is the reason for the ECtHR finding such a duty embedded in Article 3? 
According to the ECtHR itself, it is because of the need to maintain confidence in 
the rule of law; and the need to prevent any appearance of tolerance or collusion 
in unlawful acts (Milanovic v Serbia). So what have the police to do exactly under 
this new duty? The ECtHR has explained the scope of the state’s obligations under 
this duty, in the case of Denis Vasilyev v Russia App No 32704/04 (17th December 
2009). For the investigation to be regarded as effective, it had to in principle, be 
capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible. The authorities must have 
taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning 
the incident, including eye witness testimony, and forensic evidence. Mr Justice 
Green, in providing a summary of principles laid down in the Strasbourg case law, 
articulated the time frame in which the police’s actions would be open to analysis, 
as being from the time of assault on the claimant to the last point in the criminal 
process including the trial, although in the case of a serial offender, the starting 
point may be the first point in time that evidence of a person offending comes to 
the police’s attention. The duty is one of means not results. A successful 
prosecution within a reasonable period of time will nullify prior operational failures. 
However if the prosecution is brought after an unreasonable period of time the 
operational failures in the lead up to that prosecution may still be relevant in 
determining whether the public authority breached Article 3. In the context of 
operational failures, it will however only be operational failures that are capable 
of leading to the apprehension and prosecution of an offender. It is not just any 
operational failure that will establish liability on the police. This brings us back to 
the standard of care that the police are being held to account to. The law is not 
looking for perfection. In the Worboys case there were some fairly blatant failings 
in the recognition and handling of a drug facilitated sexual assault by junior officers 
and a serious lack of supervision by more senior officers. The policies that were in 
place were not subject to criticism, it was the systemic and operational conduct 
that was so flawed. Mr Justice Green clarified that the duty existed in relation to 
both systemic failures and operational failures.   
 
Mr Justice Green recognises the inevitable subjective nature of the assessment as 
to whether a particular investigation is reasonable or capable of leading to the 
apprehension, charge and conviction of a suspect and that each case will very 
much depend on its own facts. Such an assessment is he says, subject to a margin 
of appreciation and also to proportionality. He opines that factors that may be 
relevant will include the resources available to the police; the nature of the 
offence; whether the victim fell into an especially vulnerable category; and 
whether the operational failures were caused by (up stream) systemic failures in 
the law or in the practice of the police.    
 
There are obviously inevitable difficulties in a court carrying out the sort of 
assessment that Mr Justice Green and the Strasbourg court are suggesting. Mr 
Justice Green stated however that the domestic court, when determining the 
quality of the investigation of the police, should not take a sweeping and 
generalised view but should examine the case in detail and with care. He warned 
that a finding of breach should not be arrived at lightly.  
 
The decision in the Worboys case contrasts markedly with the common law 
position in delict/tort. At present the police enjoy an immunity from negligence 
claims for failures in their investigation and prevention of crime. The policy issues 
first raised in Hill in relation to a member of the general public, have been relied 
on in Brooks where the claimant was a witness and also a potential suspect, and 
Smith, where the claimant was a victim. The two main policy reasons that have 
stood the test of time are the defensive practices concern and the diversion 
/expenditure of resources concern. There has been much criticism of these policy 
reasons however. Does the Worboys case not suggest that it is time for a re-think 
of the public policy considerations that have been relied upon in this area to date? 
Hill was decided back in 1988, before events such as the Hillsborough disaster, 
which have since shown that the police are as capable of getting it wrong as any 
other public body. Healthcare professionals and social workers owe a duty of care 
to children who they are making decisions about- D v East Berkshire Community 
Health NHS Trust [2004] QB 558. In England, the liability of lawyers in civil and 
criminal court appearances has been established in Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 
615. The fire brigade owe a duty of care in relation to their fire fighting activities 
– Duff v Highlands and Islands Fire Board 1995 SLT 1362. Why not the police? 
Rather than relying on policy reasons that don’t stand up to scrutiny shouldn’t the 
police be held to account for serious failings in the same way as most other 
providers of a service? No one suggests that doctors should not be held liable for 
their negligence because otherwise they would act in a particularly defensive 
manner. The Scottish Courts already recognise the liability of the police in relation 
to civil operational tasks (Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420). 
Times have changed since the time Hill was decided. The public’s view of the police 
has changed. Brookes did not have to follow Hill as it was a quite different factual 
situation. Hill concerned a member of the general public. A refusal of a duty of 
care in this situation could be defended on the basis of the policy reason of the 
floodgates of litigation, but also because of a lack of sufficient proximity. Brooks 
concerned a witness and a potential suspect. Smith concerned a victim. In contrast 
to Hill, the facts in Brooks and Smith gave rise to a high degree of proximity 
between the claimant and the police. Brookes should be overruled by the Supreme 
Court. It is time for a public policy update. The Worboys case has brought the 
public policy reasons for granting immunity to the police in certain circumstances, 
under the common law of delict/tort under further renewed scrutiny, and the 
reasons just don’t stand up to that scrutiny. Surely human rights considerations 
themselves have to form part of the policy considerations that are now considered 
by a court. The proximity tool in the tripartite test is sufficient to ensure that the 
liability net is not cast too widely in delict/tort actions against the police. 
 
 
 
